讲座题目：Partial Vertical Ownership Cooperation between Manufacturers and Sharing Economy Platforms
主讲嘉宾：李武
时间：2025年5月14日（星期三）下午14:00—16:00
地点：QY球友会116东方厅
欢迎广大师生参加！
QY球友会
2025年5月9日
主讲嘉宾简介
李武博士,加拿大温莎大学OdetteQY球友会管理科学教授。主要研究方向包括供应链管理、决策理论与方法以及冲突分析等。研究获得三项加拿大自然科学与工程研究基金会发现基金项目的支持，同时也多次得到国家教育部春晖计划短期项目支持以及日本学术振兴会（JSPS）外籍聘用研究员（Invitational Fellowship）项目的支持于2011年和2015年到东京工业大学进行访问研究。自2001年以来，在国际期刊如Production and Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Part A, Information Sciences, International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of Production Research, Transportation Research: Part E, Water Resources Research等发表73篇学术论文，李武教授的研究工作得到国内外同行的广泛引用(SCI/SSCI累计引用3000余次，h指数31)，五篇论文先后列为ESI高被引论文，在相关领域产生一定影响，现任Group Decision and Negotiation（SSCI）和Information Sciences（SCI）的Associate Editor及多个其他国际期刊的编委和International Journal of Production Economics, Information Sciences, Industrial Management & Data Systems, Group Decision and Negotiation等客座编辑。
讲座主要内容
Given an increasing number of manufacturers entering the sharing economy market via equity investment in third-party platforms, this paper establishes a game model to characterize such partial vertical ownership (PVO) cooperation. We consider a manufacturer (M) interacting with a retailer (R) and sharing economy platform (SEP), where M first negotiates a transfer payment to SEP for their PVO cooperation in a Nash bargaining manner and, then, employs two wholesale price contracts for SEP and R to induce non-cooperative operational interactions among them. By examining the equilibrium of the game, we obtain the following results. First, the PVO cooperation level affects SEP’s selection of a P2P or hybrid business model only if M’s marginal sales cost to SEP is in an intermediate range. Second, the cooperatively negotiated transfer payment from M to SEP for PVO cooperation increases (is constant) in its cooperation level and SEP’s bargaining power if M’s capital constraint on the transfer payment is non-binding (binding), but it is always strictly lower than the return for the equity investment, i.e., the operational profit distribution from SEP to M. Third, without M’s capital constraint, PVO cooperation is always achievable and given a cooperatively negotiated transfer payment for this cooperation, a higher PVO cooperation level benefits M, R, SEP, consumers, and the social planner, but PVO cooperation is attainable only if its level is capped within a reasonable range in the presence of M’s capital constraint.
当前位置: